Vanderbilt Law Review
Volume 15
Issue 3 Issue 3 - June 1962

Article 19

6-1962

State and Local Taxation -- 1961 Tennessee Survey (II)
Paul J. Hartman

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr
Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons, and the Tax Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Paul J. Hartman, State and Local Taxation -- 1961 Tennessee Survey (II), 15 Vanderbilt Law Review 948
(1962)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol15/iss3/19

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information,
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

State and Local TaXiation - 1961
Tennessee Survey (II)
PaulJ. Hartman*
I. PRIVILEGE TAXEs-ExACTIONS FOR OFERAInON OF OIL PEDDLERS WAGON
II. PRIVILEGE TAXEs-TAXATION

OF TRAMPoINES AS AN "AMUSEMENT PARK"

During the period covered by this survey the pickings by way of decided
cases have been pretty slim. Only two cases are here the subject of
extended comment.' However, the comprehensive congressional study of
state taxation of multistate business has been extended until July 1, 1963.
The expanded congressional study now being conducted includes all forms
of state taxation of interstate commerce, such as franchise taxes, sales and
use taxes, gross receipts taxes, and ad valorem taxes. Under the chairmanship of Congressman Willis, a subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee with the help of a sizeable staff and an advisory group of ten members, is conducting a fact-finding study designed to ascertain not only the
problems that need solution but also some feasible solutions.2
I. PRnILEGE TAXES-EXACTrIONS FOR OPERATION OF OIL PEDDLER'S WAGON
3
Whether the complaining taxpayer in Westate Oil Co. v. Featherstone
was entitled to recover for taxes paid under protest turned on whether
taxpayer engaged in the taxable privilege of operating an "oil peddler's
wagon," as defined in the statute imposing the tax. Taxpayer, a dealer in
oil, had paid taxes for the privilege of operating oil depots and wholesale
wagons, and it was taxpayer's contention that, having paid these privilege
taxes, it was not subject to the tax imposed on the privilege of operating
an oil wagon. Presently, we will see what these taxes were imposed upon.
The business of taxpayer consisted of selling petroleum products wholesale, and the delivery of these commodities to customers. To facilitate the
carrying on of its business, taxpayer maintained a large oil depot or bulk
storage plant and warehouse at Milan, Tennessee. The petroleum products
*Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Tennessee Bar.
1. For a comment elsewhere in this survey of the Tennessee law on the case of
Combustion Eng'r Co. v. McFarland, 349 S.W.2d 138 (Tenn. 1961), see Morgan &
Handler, Procedure and Evidence-1961 Tennessee Survey (II), 15 VAND. L. REV. 925
(1962).
2. See Hartman, State and Local Taxation-1961 Tennessee Survey, 14 VAND. L. REv.
1401 (1961) for a more detailed treatment of this congressional study.
3. 348 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. 1961).
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handled by taxpayer were bought by it from a seller in Shelby County,

Tennessee, and these products were disposed of by taxpayer in one of two
ways: (1) part thereof was transported to its Milan plant, there stored,
and from this plant taxpayer subsequently withdrew these products and
delivered them to its customers; (2) part of taxpayer's products were
transported directly to its customers from the Shelby County supplier where
taxpayer made the purchases without ever coming to rest at the Milan
depot.
The privilege tax called into judgment in the Westate Oil case was
imposed upon the operation of an "oil peddlers wagon," which includes the
use of any vehicle to deliver petroleum products to dealers or customers
where the owner or operator buys the products from an oil depot or other
place not maintained by the owner or operator. 4 The simple issue in this
case, therefore, was whether taxpayer's direct deliveries of petroleum
products from the place of purchase in Shelby County to its customers
constituted operating an "oil wagon" within the purview of this statutory
definition of that taxable privilege.
Reversing the lower court, the Tennessee Supreme Court seems properly
to have held that taxpayer did engage in such a taxable privilege. In the
1957 case of Moto-Pep, Inc. v. McGoldrick,5 the court had rather effectively
cut the ground from under Westate's claim that the payment of a tax for
the privilege of operating an oil depot, with the tax computed upon the
gallons sold, prevented the imposition of the tax in question. In Moto-Pep,
the court held that the tax there exacted for the privilege of operating an
oil depot could not include in its computation those petroleum products
which did not pass through taxpayer's taxed depot but that the tax could
be based only on the gallonage of oil which actually passed through the
storage tanks of the taxed oil depot. In short, Moto-Pep excluded from the
reach of the tax those petroleum products sold by taxpayer and delivered
directly from its supplier to its customers. That clearly answered the contention in Westate that the payment of the oil depot tax precluded the
levy of the "oil peddler's wagon" tax. They are two mutually exclusive,
statutorily created taxable privileges.
Furthermore, Westate's payment of the tax for the privilege of operating
wholesale oil wagons or trucks does not preclude the exaction for the
privilege of operating an oil peddlers wagon. The tax upon the operation
of wholesale oil wagons or trucks was imposed upon the privilege of
delivering petroleum products to dealers or consumers from taxpayer's oil
depot.6 Whereas, as we have just seen, the controverted "oil peddler's
4. TENN. CODE ANN.§ 67-4203, item 71(c) (1956).
5. 202 Tenn. 119, 303 S.W.2d 326 (1957). For a critical comment on this case
by the writer soon after the case was decided, see Hartman, State and Local Taxation1958 Tennessee Survey, 11 VAND. L. Rxv. 1391 (1958).
6. TENN.CODE ANN.§ 67-4203, item 71(b) (1956).
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wagon" tax in the Westate case was imposed for the privilege of delivering
oil directly from taxpayer's supplier in Shelby County to taxpayer's customers. Here, again, we have two mutually exclusive, statutorily created
taxable privileges.
EG TA=Xs-TAXATION OF TRAiMoLINms As AN "AMuSEMET PARl"
The issue in Holt v. Worral17 was whether the complaining taxpayer
operated an "amusement park" within the meaning of a tax statute; under
the statute, amusement parks, when maintained at a permanent location, are
subject to a specific tax and are exempted from all other taxes. 8 The State
claimed in this case that taxpayer did not qualify as an amusement park and
was therefore subject to a privilege tax.
Taxpayer maintained a recreational center within which were located
fifteen trampolines; there is no mention in the opinion whether any other
types of amusement were located at taxpayer's recreational center. A
trampoline is described by the court in Holt v. Worrall as consisting of
strong cloth fifteen feet by ten feet in size, stretched and held tightly in
position by, and secured to, a metal frame. It provides a springboard effect
when jumped upon, and facilitates the performance of acrobatics when
used. The charge for using the trampoline was fifty cents per hour. Taxpayer's fifteen trampolines were located within a cyclone fence adjacent to
a heavily travelled highway. At this location, taxpayer also sold soft drinks
and packaged food items.
As a basis for the tax claim in Holt v. Worrall, the State relied on a
statutory provision imposing a privilege tax on all "devices operated by
persons as a course of profit, such as devices wherein may be seen pictures,
or devices for throwing at wooden figures or any other object . . .
Based on this statute a tax had earlier been sustained in G & S Distributing
Co. v. Cobb,10 where a tariff had been imposed on the privilege of "kiddyrides," which were devices placed in retail establishments. The State relied
upon this case as authority for levying the tax in Holt v. Worrall.
The Tennessee Supreme Court invalidated the Holt v. Worrall tax and
granted a refund to the taxpayer. Taxpayer's operations were thought by
the court to be an "amusement park," and as such exempt by statute from
any privilege tax other than the tax imposed for the privilege of operating
an amusement park. The G & S tax on the "kiddy-rides" was distinguished
on the ground of the lack of permanency of location of the "kiddy-rides,"
which were located in retail mercantile establishments. The Holt v. Worrail
operation, on the other hand, had a more or less permanent location.
II. Pxv

7. 348 S.W.2d 302 (Tenn. 1961).
8. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4203, item 75 (1956).
9. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4203, item 49(c) (1956).
10. 197 Tenn. 573, 276 S.W.2d 729 (1955).
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Although the trampoline operation in question was more or less permanent,
there still remains the question whether taxpayer operated an "amusement
park."
Since the Holt v. Worrall taxpayer seemingly operated only trampolines,
there is some doubt whether his operation constituted an "amusement park."
It has been held elsewhere that an "essential attribute of an 'amusement
park' is the grouping together in one place of various amusements for
pleasurable diversion."" Facilities for picnicking and refreshment have not
been regarded as amusements when accompanying a public swimming pool,
but only as incidents to enhance the attraction of the pool to members of
the public enjoying swimming as a pastime.' 2 Similarly, the sale of soft
drinks and food items in Holt v. Worrall might well be regarded, not as a
separate amusement, but only as an incident to enhance the attraction of
the trampolines; that apparently would leave only the trampolines as the
source of amusement. On the other hand, the fifteen trampolines may be
regarded as fifteen separate amusements in order to make up the requisite
"various amusements" so as to constitute an "amusement park."
11. Tice v. Borough of Woodcliff Lake, 12 N.J. Super. 20, 78 A.2d 825, 826 (Super.
Ct. 1951) (Only one amusement was planned-swimming pool and bath house. Under
a zoning ordinance this was held not to constitute an amusement park.).

12 Ibid.

